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Abstract: This paper deals with jiha >d and suicide bombings 
from the perspective of Indonesian salafism. It is argued 
that there are two different points of view related to this 
issue. The first is those who are affiliated with Wahha >bi > 
salafists such as those involved in Salafi-based foundations 
like As-Sunnah, Ihyaut Turats, al-Sofwah, Lajnah al-
Khairiyah, Lajnah al-Istiqamah, and Wahdah Islamiyyah. 
They do not agree with suicide bombing directed to 
Western targets—mainly America—and its symbols. 
Suicide bombings are equivalent to killing oneself, and this 
is extremely forbidden in Islam. The second is Salafi-
jiha >dists who have justified suicide bombing attacks to 
infidel targets and the symbols of t }a >gu>t (false god). The 
reason is blowing oneself is not the same as committing 
suicide, for suicide is a sin. However, he is believed as 
carrying out “martyrdom operations”, sacrificing himself 
for the sake of the superior goal of defending his religion 
and community, while suicide is a hopeless deed performed 
by a person who kills himself for his own selfish reason. 
Keywords: Indonesian salafism, jihad, suicide bombings, 
Wahha >bi>-salafism 
Introduction 
Salafism is seen as a social movement in the discourse of Islamic 
thought. From a sociological point of view, social movement may be 
studied from two considerable paradigms. The first paradigm is put 
forward by Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian,1 who divide social 
movement into three categories; first, value-oriented movement, in 
which the members have commitment to the principle of rejecting all 
                                                                
1 Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Collective Behaviour (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
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forms of compromise for sake of a desired goal; second, power-
oriented movement, whose main goal is to seize power, status and 
recognition for the members of movement. One of the dogma of this 
movement is the assumption that by having control over economic 
and political power, anything deemed as evil in society can be wiped 
out; third, participation-oriented movement, which may take many 
forms such as passive-reform movement that only voices defects in 
society, but never tried to actively eradicate them, or personal-status 
movement that recommends a redefinition of an existing status system, 
by which their status is expected to be raised. 
The second paradigm is proposed by David Aberle who divides 
social movement into transformative, reformative, redemptive and 
alternative.2 Transformative movement is a movement which aims at 
bringing about changes comprehensively for individuals or societies, 
which usually involve violence and destruction. Reformative 
movement is usually carried out to eradicate defects in an existing 
social system; however, it does not destroy its basic structure. 
Redemptive movement is a movement that is focused more on 
individual changes than institutional ones, while alternative movement 
makes an effort to partially alter an individual’s behavior. This 
movement assumes that human beings are naturally good; however, it 
would be better if their bad characters and behavior are eradicated. 
As a social movement, Salafism is not in an intellectual vacuum, 
but emerges in the environment surrounded by intellectual 
turbulences, and is based on a sturdy epistemological foundation. This 
following issue deals with an historical sketch of Salafism and its 
epistemological foundation on which this movement and its activities 
are based. 
The Brief History and Epistemology of Salafism 
The term “Salafism” contains two words “salaf” and “ism”. The 
word “salaf” refers to “ancestors, predecessors,”3 while “ism” generally 
refers to “system of belief.”4 If combined, the word “Salafism” may 
                                                                
2 Cited in Frank N. Magill, International Encyclopedia of Sociology, Vol. 2 (London, Chicago: 
Salem Press, 1995), p. 1244; Gordon Marshall, Oxford Dictionary of Sociology, 2nd Edition 
(Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 166. 
3 Dictionary Composing Team, Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia, Third Edition (Jakarta: 
Balai Pustaka, 2005), p. 982. 
4 Ibid., p. 444. 
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mean “system of belief that is based on the practice of pious ancestors 
or predecessors.” The Arabic word describing this meaning is salafiyyah, 
while its advocates are called salafi> (plural: salafiyyu>n).5 In Arabic 
dictionaries, there are myriad of meanings attached to the word salaf. It 
may refer to “loan and payment in advance” (al-qard} wa al-salam), “all 
activities carried out previously by someone” (kull ‘amal qaddamahu al-
‘abd), and “preceding nation in history” al-qawm al-mutaqaddimu>n fi> al-
sayr).6 However, the most appropriate meaning in our discussion is the 
second and third meaning. 
The difference of opinions occurs while discussing a technical 
meaning of the word salaf. It relates to the question whether the word 
salaf refers to a period of time or a particular method. Those who 
advocate the first meaning have different opinion on the speciﬁcation 
of the period of salaf. According to Ami>r, al-Qayrawa>ni> limits that 
period only to the Companions of the Prophet (S{ah }a>bah), Al-Ghaza>li > 
limits it only to the periods of S {ah }a>bah and Ta>bi‘i >n (a generation after 
S{ah}a>bah),7 while Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Shawka>ni>, the majority of Muslim 
                                                                
5 The use of the word salafi> is initially introduced by al-Sam’a>ni> who states that salafi> is 
an attribution to the word salaf, and an adherence to this school. See ‘Abd al-Kari>m ibn 
Muh}ammad al-Sam‘a>ni>, al-Ansa>b, Vol. 7 (Kairo: Maktabah Ibn Taymiyyah, 1976), p. 
104. 
6 Arabic text is from the book Lisa>n al-‘Arab, see Ibn Manz }u >r, Lisa>n al-‘Arab, Vol. 4 
(Kairo: Da>r al-H{adi>th, 2003), p. 649; Sayyid Muh }ammad Murtad }a> al-H{usayni> al-Zabi>di>, 
Ta>j al-‘Aru >s min Jawa >hir al-Qa>mu>s, Tah }qi>q: ‘Abd al-Fatta>h} al-H{ilw, Vol. 23 (Kuwait: 
Mat }ba‘ah H {uku >mah al-Kuwayt, 1986), pp. 454-55; Muh }ammad ibn Ya‘qu >b al-
Fayru >za>ba>di>, al-Qa>mu>s al-Muh}i>t }, Vol. 3 (Mesir: al-Hay’ah al-Mis}riyyah al-‘A <mah li al-
Kita>b, 1979), p. 149; al-Khali>l ibn Ah }mad al-Fara>hi>di>, Kita>b al-‘Ayn, Tah}qi>q: ‘Abd al-
H{ami>d Handa>wi>, Vol. 2 (Beirut: Da >r al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 2003), p. 265; Isma >‘i >l ibn 
H{amma>d al-Jawhari>, al-S {ih}a >h}: Ta>j al-Lughah wa S {ih}a>h} al-‘Arabiyyah, Tah}qi>q: Ah}mad ‘Abd 
al-Ghafu >r ‘At }t }a>r, Vol. 4 (Beirut: Da >r al-‘Ilm li al-Mala>yi>n, 1979), p. 1376; Majma‘ al-
Lughah al-‘Arabiyyah, al-Mu‘jam al-Wasi >t }, 4th Edition (Mesir: Maktabah al-Shuru >q al-
Dawliyyah, 2004), p. 444. This word salafi> in the dictionary of al-Mu‘jam al-Wasi >t } is 
defined as “those who return to the Quran and Sunnah and invalidate other sources in 
Islamic laws” (man yarji‘ fi > al-ah}ka>m al-shar‘iyyah ila> al-kita>b wa al-sunnah wa yuhdir ma > 
siwa>ha>). 
7 Abu > H{a>mid Muh }ammad al-Ghaza>li>, “Ilja>m al-‘Awwa >m ‘an ‘Ilm al-Kala>m,” in 
Majmu >‘ah Rasa >’il al-Ima >m al-Ghaza>li>, Tah }qi>q: Ibra>hi>m Ami >n Muh }ammad (Kairo: al-
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scholars expands it to three periods such as S{ah }a>bah, Ta>bi‘i>n and Ta>bi‘ 
al-Ta>bi‘i>n (a generation after Ta>bi‘i>n).8 The reason for this limitation is 
more theological than sociological, because there is a h}adi>th of the 
Prophet which states “The best people are those living in my 
generation, and then those who will follow them, and then those who 
will follow the latter.”9 
However, from sociological point of view, the term salaf is raised in 
the context of the struggle of thought in Islam. It happened during the 
caliphate of ‘Abba>siyyah, in which an intellectual atmosphere and 
scientific environment was so widely open that it allowed the 
emergence of Islamic studies, scholarly debates, and writing of 
academic works. As the consequence, there emerged a diverse group 
of studies, which later became a school (madhhab, firqah). In its 
development, these schools established different methodological 
tendencies. Some scholars stick to mind reasoning, like Mu'tazilites and 
the philosophers, called as as }h}a>b al-ra’y, while others insist on the text 
(nas }s }), known as as}h}a>b al-h}adi>th. 
Both scholars have been in serious tension and conflict in the 
following years. Mutazilites neglected many Prophetic traditions and 
naql (narration), treated ahl al-h}adi>th unfairly, and denied them. They 
also did ta’wi >l (allegorical interpretation) of the allegedly ambiguous 
Qur’anic verses (mutasha>biha>t), which is not acceptable among the 
scholars of ahl al-sunnah. Otherwise, ahl al-h}adi>th often claimed as the 
followers of pious Salaf scholars from the generation of Companions 
and Ta>bi’i >n who relied on religious texts, as a counter-hegemony 
against the rationalist views of the philosophers and theologians 
widespread in the period of ‘Abba>siyyah. However, since rationalist 
thought represented by the Mu’tazilites at that time was more 
                                                                
8 Ja>bir Idri>s ‘Ali > Ami>r, Manhaj al-Salaf wa al-Mutakallimi>n fi> Muwa>faqah al-‘Aql li al–Naql 
wa Athar al-Manhajayn fi > al-‘Aqi>dah, Vol. 1 (Riya >d }: Ad }wa>’ al-Salaf, 1998), 36-37; See also, 
‘I <sa> ibn Na>s}ir al-Darabi>, “Min Ma‘a>lim al-Taysi>r fi> Tafsi>r al-Salaf,” Majallah al-Buh}u>th wa 
al-Dira>sa>t al-Qur’a >niyyah, No. 3, Year II, pp. 163-164. 
9 The text of the h}adi>th:  
This h}adi>th is narrated by al-Bukha>ri> in bahasan Fad}a>’il al-S {ah}a>bah bab fad}a >’il as }h}a>b al-
Nabi> s }alla> Alla>h ‘alayh wa sallam and Muslim in the chapter of Fad}a>’il al-S {ah}a>bah (h}adi>th 
no: 210, 211, 212) through the narration of ‘Abd Alla>h ibn Mas‘u >d.  
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dominant due to the support of power, then ahl al-h}adi>th’s thought with 
its leading scholars, Ah}mad ibn H{anbal, suffered from exclusion.  
In addition to the issues of Islamic conquest and the conversion of 
the adherents of other faiths into Islam, the spread of heresy (zindi>q) 
and the emergence of the people involved in spreading doubts, art of 
debate, and method of argumentation, to confuse Muslims and sow 
doubts on the understanding of Islamic theology, take part in 
strengthening Salafi’s method and movement. These factors, according 
to the al-Bu>t }i>,10 appeared at the last period of the Companions in a 
limited way, but began to expand and increase at the time of the 
expansion of Islamic conquest and the conversion of other faith’s 
followers into Islam. It attracted the attention of Salafi scholars—
among them is Ah}mad ibn H {anbal—and encouraged them to counter 
those influences in order that Islamic theology is not covered with 
cloud of doubt, delusions, and misleading thoughts. This especially 
happened in the reign of ‘Abba>siyyah. 
Therefore, based on the above description it can be said that 
Salafism both as a movement and method emerged in the era Ah }mad 
ibn H{anbal, when the 'Abba>siyyah had been in power. Therefore, it is 
no exaggeration that Salafism is essentially a phenomenon of 
‘Abba>siyyah arising as a result of the Muslim’s weaknesses in the face 
of the rationalist thinking of the philosophers and theologians, in 
addition to their attachment to the clear and simple religious texts. The 
majority of Muslim Arabs before the Islamic conquest are a modest 
society supported by a limited civilization. Nomadic environment 
(bada>wah) in which they lived resembles a plain sheet in the sense that 
they merely understand Islamic texts of the Quran and the Sunnah of 
the Prophet, without undertaking ta’wi>l (allegorical exegesis) and qiya>s 
(analogical reasoning). The modesty of life and the lack of structure 
and complexity in the Arabian Peninsula maintains the method 
adopted by them in understanding Islam, “textualist method” (al-nahj 
al-nus }u>s }i>), which gives priority to the text over philosophy, and 
narrative (al-ma’thu>r) over qiya>s.11  
                                                                
10 Muh}ammad Sa‘i >d Ramad }a>n al-Bu >t }i>, al-Salafiyyah: Marh }alah Zamaniyyah Muba >rakah La > 
Madhhab Isla >mi>  (Damaskus: Da >r al-Fikr, 1990), p. 35. 
11 Muh}ammad ‘Ima>rah, al-Salafiyyah (Tunisia: Da>r al-Ma’a>rif, nd.), p. 9. 
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The next scholar who is considered to be the most determined to 
defend Salafism is Ah }mad Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728/1328), whose 
framework of thought in the field of law and theology is the same as 
Ibn H {anbal. He became a main reference for any Salafi movement. In 
matters of faith, the principles should be drawn from the text, as well 
as legal issues. Intellect, from Ibn Taymiyyah’s point of view, has no 
authoritative power, but only serves to reinforce the law, not create it. 
The function of reason is to bring narrative (manqu >l) closer to reason 
(ma‘qu>l), without having an authoritative power either to reject or 
accept it.12 
In the contemporary era, there is a significant shift in terms of the 
methods and approaches to the understanding of religious texts. If the 
Salafi movement seemed previously so rigid in their understanding of 
Islam, but in the contemporary era, Salafi movement shows something 
fresh, although the issue of monotheism is relatively not different. This 
condition cannot be separated from the role of important figures such 
as Jama>l al-Di>n al-Afgha>ni> and Muh}ammad ‘Abduh. Both figures are 
considered as the early pioneers and founders of the modern Salafi 
movement at the end of the 19th century. 
The idea of modern Salafi is based on some of the following goals 
(1) To purify Islam from all forms of innovation (bid‘ah) that can affect 
its purity based on the Quran and Sunnah; (2) To free Islamic law from 
blind imitation of traditional schools of Islamic jurisprudence; (3) To 
perform ijtiha>d as the best media to bridge the gap between historical 
Islam and modernity; (4) To introduce a modern education system 
which reconciles the religious and secular sciences; and (5) To revive 
Arabic linguistics in order to facilitate the interpretation of the 
authentic Islamic sources (Quran and Sunnah).13 
In the later development, the Salafi movement is different to a 
great deal from what reformers echoed. Rid}a>’s views later gain a place 
among the extreme-right group. Influential figures who echoed Rid}a>’s 
views include H {asan al-Banna> and Sayyid Qut }b. Both of these figures 
have a number of the same principles. Both saw Islam as a 
                                                                
12 Sayyid ‘Abd al-‘Azi>z al-Si>li>, al-‘Aqi>dah al-Salafiyyah bayn al-Ima>m Ibn H {anbal wa al-Ima >m 
Ibn Taymiyyah (Kairo: Da>r al-Mana>r, 1993), p. 272. 
13 Ahmed Ibrahim Abushouk, “Al-Mana>r and the H {adhrami > Elite in the Malay-
Indonesian World: Challenge and Response,” JRAS, Series 3, Vol. 17, No. 3 (2007), p. 
304.  
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comprehensive system that provides a range of guidance for all areas 
of life. Both identified their interpretation of Islam with Islam itself, 
and believed that alternative readings are not valid. Both did not 
believe in reason, and prioritized actions over thoughts. Both have the 
same view of what is required by the Islamic government in the future. 
Finally, they regarded violence as a legitimate medium for establishing 
Islamic order that they missed.14 
Islamic government is considered as an integral part of Islam, and 
is essential to ensure the implementation of shariah. The model that 
should be followed is that was once epitomized by the Prophet and the 
Guided Chalips (al-khulafa>’ al-ra>shidu>n). Al-Banna > assumed that the 
Companions as noble knights who runs jihad not for worldly interests 
or personal ambition, but to guide them to the path of Islam, while 
Qut}b stated that the Companions are God’s chosen servants to show 
humanity as a model that should be followed.15 
According to these two scholars, all existing political systems have 
failed. Neither capitalist nor socialist systems are able to provide moral 
and spiritual values human beings need. As a result, the Western world 
has immersed in a variety of mental illnesses, sexual impropriety, and 
moral degradation. Therefore, the world needs Islam. The strategies to 
bring about these changes, according to al-Banna>, is to preach by way 
of the indoctrination of the masses—from  individuals to families, 
societies, government, and the last, the world in general.16 Meanwhile, 
according to Qut}b, preaching is not enough. Jiha>d is important to 
protect the Islamic mission (da‘wah) and eliminate the physical and 
mental barriers that prevent a person to be a true Muslim.17 However, 
in the case of those who do not accept such propaganda, al-Banna > 
asserted that Islam emphasizes being kind to minorities and confirmed 
that establishing peaceful relationships with them is possible. However, 
al-Banna> insists that Muslims must wage jihad until all people say 
“there is no god but Allah and Muhammad is his messenger,” and 
                                                                
14 Ana Belén Soage, “H{asan al-Banna> and Sayyid Qut }b: Contiunity or Rupture?” The 
Muslim World,Vol. 99, no. 2 (April 2009), p. 295. 
15 Ibid., p. 300.  
16 Ibid., pp. 302-3. 
17 Ibid., pp. 303-304. 
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fighting the Jews and Christians is an obligation that brings multiple 
rewards from God.18 
Some important principles contained in al-Banna>’s wiritngs is 
supported by radical Islamic groups. One example that might represent 
this is the al-Banna>’s view on jiha>d, which is considered as one of the 
pillars of Islam. Jiha>d, in al-Banna>’s view, is a “military struggle.”19 The 
idea was the main argument for the treatise of al-Fari>d}ah al-Gha>’ibah 
(the Lost Obligation), an influential pamphlet written by ‘Abd al-Salam 
Faraj, drafting organizational ideology that once killed Anwar Saddat in 
October 1981. Various radical movements in the following modern era 
have been basically influenced by such figures as H{assa>n al-Banna> dan 
Sayyid Qut }b.  
Indonesian Salafism on Jiha >d and Suicide Bombings 
Wahha>bi-Salafism  
In Indonesia, there is a variety of Salafism. However, the most 
salient in the discourse of Salafism is Salafi-Wahhabism and Salafi-
Jihadism. Salafi-Wahhabism is known as a sect in Islamic movements 
which is related to its main figure,  Muh}ammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahha >b 
and his advocates such as ‘Abd al-‘Azi>z ibn Ba>z and Muh}ammad S{a>lih } 
al-‘Uthaymi >n. These figures are known as purists promoting literalism 
in understanding Islamic texts. As the name suggests, the “purists” are 
primarily concerned with maintaining the purity of Islam as outlined in 
the Qur’an, Sunna, and consensus of the Companions. They believe 
that the primary emphasis of the movement should be promoting the 
Salafi creed and combating deviant practices, just as the Prophet 
fought polytheism, human desire, and human reason.  
This movement is seen as anti-rationalism, anti-intellectualism, 
anti-mysticism, and strict literalism, which is hostile to humanistic 
epistemology, and attempts to interpret the Divine law without any 
degree of contextualization, thereby proclaiming ‘the diacritical and 
indeterminate hermeneutic of classical jurisprudential hermeneutic as 
                                                                
18 Ibid., p. 304. 
19 H{asan al-Banna>, “Risa>lah al-Jiha>d” in Majmu >‘ah al-Rasa>’il al-Ima>m al-Shahi>d H {asan al-
Banna> (Alexandria: Da >r al-Da’wah, 1998), pp. 263, 279. 
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corruptions of purity of Islamic faith and law’.20 This oppositional 
dialectic and hostility extends not only to the ‘Western Other’ but also 
to un-likeminded Muslims. In its self-contained system of belief ‘it has 
no reason to engage or interact with the other except from the point of 
dominance’.21 
In Indonesia, this Salafi movement grew in campuses. Since 1900s, 
this movement got new impetus from the arrival of the graduates from 
Middle East and veterans from Afghanistan, including Ja’far Umar 
Thalib, Yazid Abdul Qadir Jawwas, Yusuf Usman Baisa, Muhammad 
Yusuf Harun, Ahmad Zawawi and M. Zaitun Rasmin.22 Their efforts 
to carry out Salafi missionary activities in turn make Salafi communities 
come to surface in many cities and areas in Indonesia. The far-reaching 
growth of this kind of community has produced Salafi-based 
foundations such as As-Sunnah, Ihyaut Turats, al-Sofwah, Lajnah al-
Khairiyah, Lajnah al-Istiqamah, and Wahdah Islamiyyah. The attention 
of donor foundations in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf nations to 
support Salafi missionary activities after the Gulf War in 1990 has 
facilitated this growth. In line with the mushroom-like growth of Salafi 
foundations, there emerge Salafi madrasahs in many areas of Indonsia 
(See the table 1). 
These Salafi madrasahs in Indonesia, Hasan argued,23 took the 
model of Islamic learning centre associated with Muqbil ibn Ha >di> al-
Wa>di‘i>,24 one of the most outstanding Salafi scholars in Yemen. The 
                                                                
20 Cited in Adis Duderija, “Islamic Groups and their World-views and Identities: Neo-
Traditional Salafis and Progressive Muslims,” Arab Law Quarterly, Vol. 21 (2007), p. 
349. 
21 Ibid., pp. 349-350. 
22 Noorhaidi Hasan, “Salafi Madrasahs and Islamic Radicalism in Post-New Order 
Indonesia,” in Kamaruzzaman Bustaman-Ahmad and Patrick Jory (eds), Islamic Studies 
and Islamic Education in Contemporary Southeast Asia (Malaysia: Yayasan Ilmuan, 2011), p. 
95. 
23 Ibid., p. 105. 
24 Muqbil began to receive recognition as a leading Salafi figures in the early 1980s due 
to various efforts to spread Salafi missionary movement in Yemen. His knowledge of 
the Wahhabi teachings was strengthened from his experiences of studying in Saudi 
Arabia for nearly two decades. At first, he studied in the Islamic teaching center in 
Najran, Mecca, hold by Muh}ammad ibn S {a>lih} al-‘Uthaymi >n, before getting enrolled in 
the Islamic University of Madinah. During his studies, he had the opportunity to 
attend academic circles of the most important Salafi figures, such as ‘Abd al-‘Azi>z ibn 
Ba>z dan Muh }ammad Na>s{ir al-Di>n al-Alba>ni>. He was arrested for his alleged 
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teachers in these madrasahs are graduates from this centre of Islamic 
learning. If not, they were graduated from the universities in Saudi 
Arabia controlled by Saudi’s religious scholars, mainly Muh }ammad ibn 
S{a>lih } al-‘Uthaymi>n. This teachers’ relation to the mentors from the 
Middle East is closely maintained. They maintain this relationship 
through correspondence, telephone, and fax machine, particularly 
when they feel necessary to ask questions or request legal opinions 
(fatwa>) to deal with complicated issues. 
Table 1: Salafi-Wahabism-based Pesantrens in Indonesia 
Area Name of Pesantren 
Yogyakarta Ihyaus Sunnah (1994); Bin Baz; al-Ansar; Difa’ Anis Sunnah 
Solo Al-Madinah dan Imam Bukhari (1995-2000); Ibn Taimiyah 
Magelang Minhajus Sunnah 
Semarang Lu’lu’ wal Marjan 
Cirebon As-Sunnah 
Temenggung Al-Athariyah 
Sukoharjo Ittiba’us Sunnah 
Magetan Ittiba’us Sunnah 
Jember Al-Salafy  
Ngawi Ta’zimus Sunnah  
Gresik Al-Bayyinah  
Cilacap Al-Furqan  
Pekanbaru Al-Furqan 
Makasar As-Sunnah 
Balikpapan Ibn Qayyim 
Source : Noorhaidi Hasan, “Salafi Madrasahs and Islamic Radicalism in Post-
New Order Indonesia,” in Islamic Studies and Islamic Education in 
Contemporary Southeast Asia (Malaysia: Yayasan Ilmuan, 2011), pp. 98-
99. 
One of the Salafi figures in Indonesia who had been influenced in 
a great deal by a great Yemeni salafi scholar, Muqbil ibn Ha >di> al-
Wa>di‘i>, is Ja’far Umar Thalib. He widened his knowledge on Salafi 
teachings by studying with al-Wa>di‘i> in Yemen. He also learned from 
other Salafi>-Wahha>bi> scholars through his h}ajj to Mecca and Medina. 
Whenever he visited two holy cities, he took the chance to broaden his 
knowledge of Salafi ideas by attending religious lectures given by 
prominent Saudi Salafi>-Wahha >bi> teachers, such as Muh }ammad Nas}ir 
                                                                                                                                      
involvement in a coup d’etat against the sacred mosque led by Juhayman al-‘Utaybi >. 
After his release from the prison for several months, he returned to his homeland. 
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al-Di>n al-Alba>ni> and ‘Abd al-‘Azi>z ibn Ba>z. Thalib’s encounter with 
Muqbil and other  Salafi>-Wahha >bi> ulamas refreshed and strengthened 
his ideas and commitment to the movement that he initially developed 
in Indonesia. To transfer his salafi ideas, he established his own 
pesantren (traditional Islamic education institution) named Ih }ya>’ al-
Sunnah (Preserving the Prophet’s Tradition). 
Ja’far Umar Thalib has the same opinion as other Salafists that 
jiha>d is an obligation to every Muslim. He prescribes certain limits on 
and requirements for the compulsion to commit oneself to jiha>d. He 
quoted Ibn Qayyīm al-Jawziyyah, while distinguishing four categories 
of jiha>d, the struggle against the self (jiha>d al-nafs), the struggle against 
the evil (jiha>d al-shayt }a>n), the struggle against non-believers and 
hypocrites (jiha>d al-kuffa>r wa al-muna>fiqi>n) and the struggle jiha>d arba>b al-
z}ulm wa al-bid‘ah (war against despotism and heresy).25 He argues that 
what is intrinsic in jiha>d is a struggle to be consistent in keeping to the 
straight path, identical with the jiha>d of the first category. But the 
situation in the Moluccas demands Muslims wage a jiha>d of the third 
category, namely jiha>d al-kuffa>r wa al-muna>fiqi>n.
 
This category is still 
divided into two: jiha>d al-t}alab or jiha>d al-huju>m and jiha>d al-muda>fa‘ah. In 
a jiha>d al-t}alab, one in which the offensive is taken, Muslims initiate an 
attack on infidels by offering them three choices: converting to Islam; 
paying a poll tax; or being subject to war. This sort of jiha>d is 
controlled by a host of regulations. For example, it can be carried out 
only under the command of a ruler (ima>m) whose legitimacy and 
leadership are approved by Muslims. In addition, it should be 
conducted under a strict ethical code; women and children are not 
allowed to be the targets of attacks. The jiha>d al-muda>fa‘ah is a defensive 
action, when Muslims are under attack by infidels. While the first jiha>d 
is categorized as a fard} kifa>yah, the second one is a fard} ‘ayn.26 
However, regarding suicide bombings, Thalib argues that it is 
religiously illegitimate to carry out suicide operations. It can be inferred 
from this position as a main protagonist of Sururi groups, including 
                                                                
25 Shams al-Di>n ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, Za>d al-Maʻa>d fi> Huda> Khayr al-‘Iba>d, Vol. 1 
(Cairo: Must }afa> al-Ba>bi al-H{alabi>, 1970), pp. 39–40; See also Noorhaidi, Laskar Jihad: 
Islam, Militancy and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia (Unpublished Ph.D 
Thesis, Universiteit Utrecht, 2005), p. 154. 
26 Noorhaidi, Laskar Jihad, p. 154. 
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Salma>n al-‘Awdah, S {afar al-H{awa>li>, Ayma>n al-Z{awa>hiri >, ‘Abd Alla>h 
‘Azza>m, Osama bin Laden, and Mullah ‘Umar,27 who are responsible 
for the spread of violence, radicalism and intolerance among youth of 
the country,28 and to some extent agreed with suicide attacks. Those 
who have been involved in Salafi-based foundations like As-Sunnah, 
Ihyaut Turats, al-Sofwah, Lajnah al-Khairiyah, Lajnah al-Istiqamah, 
and Wahdah Islamiyyah, also has the same opinion as other Wahha>bi > 
salafists. They do not agree with suicide bombing especially directed to 
Western targets—mainly America—and its symbols. They adopted the 
view of Muh}ammad ibn S{a>lih } ibn al-‘Uthaymi>n concerning attacking 
an enemy by blowing oneself up. When al-‘Uthaymi >n was asked the 
question “What is the ruling regarding acts of jiha>d by means of 
suicide, such as attaching explosives to a car and storming the enemy, 
whereby he knows without a doubt that he shall die as a result of this 
action,” he responded by saying, “Indeed my opinion is that he is 
regarded as one who has committed suicide, and as a result he shall be 
punished in hell, for that which is authenticated on the authority of the 
Prophet, “Indeed, whoever (intentionally) kills himself then certainly 
he will be punished in the fire of hell, wherein he shall dwell forever.”29   
Therefore, it is clear that the reason this salafi group put forward is 
that suicide bombings involve killing oneself, while suicide is strictly 
prohibited in Islam, according to the following h}adi >th of the Prophet: 
It is narrated on the authority of Abu > Hurayrah that the 
Messenger of Allah (may peace be upon him) observed: He 
who killed himself with steel (weapon) would be the eternal 
denizen of the Fire of Hell and he would have that weapon 
in his hand and would be thrusting that in his stomach 
forever and ever, he who drank poison and killed himself 
would sip that in the Fire of Hell where he is doomed 
forever and ever; and he who killed himself by falling from 
                                                                
27 Noorhaidi Hasan, “Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts in the Salafi Movement in 
Indonesia,” in Roel Meijer (ed.), Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement (London: 
Hurst & Company, 2009), pp. 185-6. 
28 Madawi Al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from A New Generation 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 79. 
29 Cited in Shireen Khan Burki, “Haram or Halal? Islamists’ Use of Suicide Attacks as 
Jihad,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 23 (2011), p. 589.  
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(the top of) a mountain would constantly fall in the Fire of 
Hell and would live there forever and ever.30 
In short, suicide attacks in the perspective of this salafi group are 
seen as un-islamic and strictly forbidden in Islam based on the sacred 
text. 
Salafi-Jihadism 
Salafi-Jihadism is a term coined by Gilles Kepel to describe the 
beliefs of Salafi who became interested in violent jihad starting in the 
mid-1990s.31 It refers to the movement which insists that violence is a 
legitimate tactic in the current social and political context in which the 
Muslim world ﬁnds itself. The aim is not just to destroy the enemy, but 
to torment and degrade it. What is distinctive about the jiha>di> wing of 
Salaﬁsm is its fusion of the Salafi elements with an ethos of murderous 
violence—an ethos, to repeat, vehemently rejected by the Salaﬁ 
mainstream. 
Teachings of Salafi-jihadism had been around in Indonesia since 
the 1940s, even they were not called Salafi-jihadism. The group that 
promoted these teachings was Darul Islam (Abode of Islam), which 
wanted to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. The movement, 
launched in West Java and led by Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo (a 
Javanese), was originally a cultural and language resistance initiative by 
the Sundanese. Filling the post-Independence power-vacuum in West 
Java at the end of 1940s, Kartosuwirjo and his supporters, the 
“Indonesian Islamic Soldiers (TII),” proclaimed the “Indonesian 
Islamic State” (NII). Hence, he openly defied not only the Dutch, but 
also the nationalist government in Jakarta. Subsequently, Darul Islam 
mushroomed in Aceh, Central Java, and South Sulawesi. 
This spirit of jiha>di> movement is continued by, first, Jamaah 
Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), established in 2008 by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, the 
former head of Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic Group). This group focuses 
on dakwah (proselytization among Muslims), participates in 
demonstrations, publishes a magazine, and does public outreach to 
spread Salafi-Jihadists ideas. It has clearly defined organizational 
structure, maintains regional branch offices down to the district and 
                                                                
30 Abu > al-H{usayn Muslim ibn al-H{ajja>j al-Ni>sa>bu >ri>, S {ah}i>h } Muslim, The Book of Faith 
(Kita>b al-I <ma>n) (Saudi Arabia: Da >r al-Afka >r al-Dawliyyah, 1998), p. 69  
31 Wikipedia, “Salafist-Jihadism,” in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salafist_jihadism. 
Accessed on 19 January 2014. 
  
Rusli 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 08, Number 01, June 2014 
104 
cell levels in areas where it has taken root, and has a paramilitary with 
that conducts training exercises. This group argued that jiha>d in 
Indonesia is absolutely fard} ‘ayn (individual obligation); therefore, no 
person or organization can prevent someone to carry out jiha>d. 
However, there is a controversy about Abu Bakar Ba’asyir 
regarding his opinion of suicide operation carried out by some people 
in Indonesia. Some people believed that Ba’asyir supported this kind of 
operation since he was a part of Jemaah Islamiyah and its alleged 
spiritual head in Indonesia,32 while in some media Ba’asyir argued that 
no Islamic law could justify an attack that injured many innocent 
people. Furthermore, he insisted that bomb attacks are an accursed act, 
sinful, except to those people proven to have attacked Muslims.33 He 
said that suicide bombing that occurred in Cirebon is an illegal act 
prohibited by Islam.34 He also strongly denied police allegations that 
the recent Surakarta church suicide bomber Pino Damayanto was 
affiliated with his organization. In his book, Ba’asyir argued that 
suicide is wrong and forbidden but istishha>d (the search for martyrdom) 
is not and that recent bombing events were such practices, although he 
regrets that they were conducted in a safe zone.35 
Second, Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic group), a clandestine Salafi 
Jihadist movement that arose in 1993 as a breakaway faction of Darul 
Islam (DI). This Salafi-jihadist combined the textual literalism of Salafi 
Islam with the belief that violent jiha>d is the best way to achieve one’s 
goals. “Darul Islam” (DI) is the umbrella term used to refer to several 
regional Islamic rebellions that fought against the Indonesia army in 
                                                                
32 Dian Intannia, “Ba’asyir Restui Bob Natal”, detik.com (29 October 2002); Editorial 
Team, “Laporan Utama,” Gatra (8 May 2004); also see International Crisis Group, 
“Indonesia Backgrounder: How The Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates,” 
Asia Report, No. 43 (11 December 2002); Adrianus Harsawaskita and Evan A. 
Laksmana, “Rethinking Terrorism in Indonesia: Lesson from The 2002 Bali 
Bombing,” UNISCI Discussion Papers, No. 15 (October 2007), p. 68. 
33 “Bombing forbidden in Islam, Ba'asyir says,” The Jakarta Post (Monday, 03 October 
2011) in http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/10/03/bombing-forbidden-is-
lam-baasyir-says.html-0. Accessed on  28 April 2014. 
34 Editorial Team, “Ba'asyir Kutuk Bom Cirebon” (15 April 2011), in http://nasional.-
news.viva.co.id/news/read/215075-ba-asyir-kutuk-bom-cirebon. Accessed on 28 April 
2014. 
35 Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Catatan Dari Penjara: Untuk Mengamalkan dan Menegakkan Dinul 
Islam (Depok: Penerbit Mushaf, 2006), pp. 281-283. 
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the 1950s before being crushed in the early 1960s. During Suharto’s 
New Order regime, Darul Islam remained an underground movement. 
In the course of history, people associated with Darul Islam have 
conducted most of the violence in the name of Islam in Indonesia, 
including attacks in 1970s and 1980s. Bali bombing that occurred on 
12 October 2002 was allegedly carried out by Jemaah Islamiyah, a 
splinter group of Darul Islam.  
One of the Indonesian Salafi-jihadists, who was convicted as an 
actor behind Bali bombing and finally sentenced to death, is Imam 
Samudra. He has his own opinion about jiha>d. He argues that jiha>d 
today is not just obligatory but a fard} ‘ayn (personal obligation) upon 
every single Muslim. This is because the classical Muslim scholars ruled 
that if an inch of a Muslim’s land is seized then it become incumbent 
to all Muslims to liberate it through armed jiha>d. In today’s context, 
Imam Samudra argues that there are plenty of Muslim lands that 
remain occupied by non-Muslims such as Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Chechnya, Kashmir, and Mindanao. Because people of the respective 
lands are not able to repel the enemy by themselves, Muslims all over 
the world are to render their hands and participate in jiha>d against the 
occupying forces.36 
In Samudra’s thought, jiha>d is understood in the frame of revenge. 
It is based on the fact that the unbelievers or infidels have attacked 
Muslims without any limits. Therefore, Muslims are obliged to take 
revenge by waging war on them. According to Samudra, jiha>d from the 
shari >’ah perspective means “waging war” on the infidels who fight 
against Islam and Muslims. He called this concept as jiha>d fi> sabi >l Alla >h 
(waging a holy war in the cause of Allah).37 In his opinion, the first 
Quranic verse on jiha>d that was revealed to the Prophet Muh }ammad is 
about waging war on the unbelievers who fight against Islam; that is, 
“And fight in the cause of Allah against those who fight against you, 
but do not transgress. Surely, Allah loves not the transgressors” (QS. 
al-Baqarah [2]: 191). War in the military history of Islam against Rome 
and Persia is based on the ethics of war which bans unlimited 
aggression; that is, a prohibition of killing women, children, elderly 
people, plants, and environment.38 
                                                                
36 Imam Samudra, Aku Melawan Teroris (Solo: Jazera, 2004), pp. 159–170. 
37 Ibid., p. 108.  
38 Ibid., pp. 115-116. 
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In Samudra’s view, if the infidels do not transgress in war, the 
ethics of Islamic war proceeds on the shari>’ah path. As long as 
Americans, Jews, and their allies do not fight against and massacre 
Muslim civilians, so the Muslim fighters (muja>hidi >n) have to wage war 
on them based on the original principle, that is, the prohibition of 
fighting against civil citizens. In fact, Americans and their allies always 
slaughter civilians in Muslim countries without any mercy. It is this 
background that brings about Samudra’s jiha>dic concept of revenge; 
war for a war, blood for blood, massacre for a massacre, and so forth. 
Therefore, a series of bombing attacks emerged in some areas, such as 
suicidal bombing of Legian Bali on 12 October 2014.  
Imam Samudra chose Bali as a target of attack, particularly Paddy’s 
Bar and Sari Club, because they were places of vices. They have no 
value in Islam. Therefore, they can be put into “waste.”  Bali is also 
claimed as used as a place of spreading apostasy among Muslims. 
Therefore, this attack is legitimate. He justifies his argument by 
quoting the verse that says, “And slay them wherever you may come 
upon them.” (QS. Al-Baqarah [2]: 191).39 The rationale behind Bali 
martyr’s bombing is that it is considered as a fight against a hostile 
enemy in revenge for the death of Muslim civilians and jiha>d in the 
path of Allah.40 Imam Samudra rejects the use of the word “suicide” 
for such an operation. Instead, he prefers to name it as ‘amaliyya>t 
istishha>diyyah (martyrdom operation), a term that is popularly used by 
those who permit or support such an act.41 He considers such an act to 
be an act of jiha>d carried out by a sincere individual in pursuit of 
martyrdom enjoined by Islam. 
In this case, the reference of Imam Samudra is Muslim scholar, 
Ibn Nuh}a>s, who cited 16 h}adi >ths (the Prophet’s tradition) about acts of 
individuals attacking an enemy’s army singlehandedly disregarding his 
own safety, which could be considered as suicidal. Imam Samudra then 
provides an explanation given by Abu > Hurayrah and Abu > Ayyu>b al-
Ans}a>ri> (both were companions of the Prophet) to put things in proper 
perspective. He reports that Abu > Hurayrah, when asked to comment 
on such incidents, read the following verse aloud, “But there is [also] a 
                                                                
39 Cited in Muhammad Haniff bin Hassan, “Imam Samudra’s Justification for Bali 
Bombing,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 30 (2007), pp. 1040. 
40 Samudra, Aku Melawan Teroris, p. 188. 
41 Ibid., pp. 175–184. 
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kind of man who would willingly sell his own self in order to please 
God. . .” (QS. Al-Baqarah [2]: 207). 
When eyewitnesses of such incidents commented, “the person has 
thrown himself into destruction,” Abu> Ayyu>b al-Ans}a>ri> corrected them 
by explaining that the following verse does not refer to such incidents, 
“And spend [freely] in God’s cause, and let not your own hands throw 
you into destruction; and persevere in doing good: behold, God loves 
the doers of good” (QS. Al-Baqarah [2]: 195). Instead, the verse 
corrected those Muslims who felt that because God had made Islam 
victorious and the number of believers had increased over the years it 
would be prudent if they now spent their time in managing the 
economy.42 
Imam Samudra points out that “the destruction” specified by the 
verse was a result of involvement in economic activities at the expense 
of jiha>d. To him, the suicide operation (istishha>d) is legitimate, and 
concluding from what Ibn Nuh}a>s had written, is strongly encouraged. 
Samudra’s view on this issue is the same as the view of other global 
Jihadi-Salaﬁsts who claimed “martyr” (shahi>d) for those who carry out 
suicidal operation. In this case, Jihadi-Salaﬁsts point out that the Quran 
recognizes and venerates the category of the martyr in verses 2:207, 
3:169, 4:69, 4:74, 4:95–96 and 9:20–22.43 The two most cited verses, 
however, are: 
Allah hath purchased of the believers their persons and their 
goods; for theirs (in return) is the garden (of Paradise): they 
ﬁght in His cause, and slay and are slain: a promise binding 
on Him in truth …” (QS. al-Tawbah (9): 111). 
And call not those who are slain in the way of Allah ‘dead.’ 
Nay, they are living, only ye perceive not. (QS. al-Baqarah 
(2): 154). 
In short, it can be argued that this group have justified the practice 
of suicide attacks or “martyrdom operations” targetted to symbols of 
t}a>gu>t (false god). Even, preeminently, the bombers are referred to as 
“martyrs” (shuhada>’) or “those who sacrifice themselves” (fida>’iyyu>n). 
                                                                
42 Cited in Muhammad Haniff, “Imam Samudra’s Justification for Bali Bombing,” p. 
1042. 
43 See Mohammed M. Hafez, “The Alchemy of Martyrdom: Jihadi Salaﬁsm and 
Debates over Suicide Bombings in the Muslim World,” Asian Journal of Social Science, 
Vol. 38 (2010), p. 37. 
  
Rusli 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 08, Number 01, June 2014 
108 
These men and women who “blow themselves up” or carry out 
“martyrdom operations” (‘amaliyya>t istishha>diyyah), do not commit 
suicide for suicide is a sin. This is because the shahi>d (martyr) has 
sacrificed himself for the sake of the superior goal of defending his 
religion and community, while common suicide is a hopeless deed 
performed by a person who kills himself for his own selfish reasons. 
Conclusion 
This paper is to analyze Indonesian Salafism on jiha>d and suicide 
bombings. From the discussion, it can be concluded that there are two 
different points of view related to this issue. The first is those who do 
not agree with suicide bombing directed to Western targets—mainly 
America—and its symbols. This is represented by Salafists who are 
involved in Salafi-based foundations like As-Sunnah, Ihyaut Turats, al-
Sofwah, Lajnah al-Khairiyah, Lajnah al-Istiqamah, and Wahdah 
Islamiyyah. The reason is that the act of suicide bombings is the same 
as killing oneself, and this is extremely forbidden in Islam. 
The second is those who have justified suicide bombing attacks to 
infidel targets and the symbols of t}a>gu>t (false gods). The reason 
includes that the people who blow themselves up do not commit 
suicide for suicide is a sin, but they carry out “martyrdom operations” 
(‘amaliyya>t istishha>diyyah). Shahi >d (martyr) has sacrificed himself for the 
sake of the superior goal of defending his religion and community, 
while common suicide is a hopeless deed performed by a person who 
kills himself for his own selfish reasons. [] 
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